While watching the Sunday night
NFL game in which Peyton Manning made “history” by breaking Brett Favre’s
short-lived record for career touchdown passes, I couldn’t help but to observe
that it seemed to me that this was the same Manning who machine-like seemed to
pass on every down to pad his statistics. I remember when Dan Marino set all
those passing records, most people thought they were “unbreakable”; until then,
most teams still put greater stock in the running game, and teams that employed
the all-out aerial assault were seen more as “gimmick” teams.
Of course, now the opposite is
true, with teams that focus on run given a great deal of lip service, but were essentially
a “dying” breed until given new “life” only by the emergence of “read-option” quarterbacks
who are not traditional pocket passers, but who rely more on their “athletic”
ability. Being a life-long Packer fan, and who unlike those bandwagonners have
deep memories of the “bad old days” post-Lombardi, I appreciated more the “miracle”
that occurred when Ron Wolfe acquired the rookie quarterback sitting on a bench
in Atlanta who didn’t seem to take his job seriously, and even his own coach
didn’t want him on the team. With some “tough love” from former San Francisco
offensive coordinator and new head coach Mike Holmgren, the rest was “history.”
But even after Favre broke all of
Marino’s records, everyone saw that Manning was running right behind him. The
only “doubt” occurred after his neck surgeries, but it was clear that in his
first season with Denver this was the same old passing machine. Regardless of
all the talk of “team” Manning mendaciously refers to press conferences, it
really has been all about him. To confirm this, I decided to do some
investigating using the data available on pro-football-reference.com and
discover to what extent that was true, utilizing Favre for comparison purposes.
In all regular season games that
Manning started for Indianapolis and Denver, there were 9197 pass plays
(including sacks) and 6570 running plays; Manning was involved in 8947 of those
pass plays. This meant that 58.3 percent
of all plays were pass plays. It is
interesting to note that for the first 10 years of Manning’s tenure in
Indianapolis, the Colts did have a sound running game—when Manning chose to use
it. I always felt that Marshall Falk—who went on to have his most productive years
with St. Louis both as a runner and as a receiver (he caught 767 passes and 36
TD passes in his career)—was traded because he was a “threat” to the rookie
quarterback’s “control” of the team.
Even after adding Edgerrin James,
the Colts continued to rely overmuch on the passing game. In 1999, despite
James leading the NFL in rushing as a rookie, the team seemed to be too pass-happy.
Although James had 369 rushing attempts, the rest of the team had only 50—and 35
of those were by Manning, likely on busted pass plays. In 2000, James again led
the NFL in rushing—but once more Manning was second on the team with 37 “rushing”
attempts; shockingly, Lennox Gordon was third on the team in rush attempts:
Four.
It was clear at least to some
observers that James was being run into the ground, being used-up as the sole
weapon on the ground. Not surprisingly he was injured in his third season, yet
pairing with Dominic Rhodes they had 1766 yards rushing. But the Colts still “relied”
heavily on the passing game, because those were the plays that Manning was by
now calling himself. A healthy James in 2004 gained 1548 yards, and the Colts
scored 522 points and were second in total yards. But in the playoffs, Manning abandoned
the run early while passing for 458 yards against a sieve-like Denver defense
in a blowout win. Fooled by this success, the Colts lost to New England in the
divisional game 20-3, after again abandoning rushing game, despite being down only
6-3 at half time; all three Colt turnovers that undid them came on pass plays.
2005 was the closest a Manning
team ever came to having a “balanced” attack—both on offense and defense. The
team ran 535 pass and 465 rushing plays, with a healthy James again topping
1500 yards. 14-2 with home field advantage heading into the playoffs, the Colts
imploded, losing to Pittsburgh 21-18 in the divisional game. In this game, Manning
again abandoned what had been working, relying on “himself.” Steelers led 21-3
in the fourth quarter, but two TD drives made it close at the end. Jerome
Bettis would fumble at the Colts’ two yard line with 1:20 to play, but Mike
Vanderjaqt missed a game-tying field goal and was penalized for unsportsmanlike
conduct.
James was gone the next season
(as if he was the “problem” in the Colts’ playoff woes). Nevertheless, Joseph
Addai and Dominic Rhodes combined for 1722 yards. The Colts advanced to the Super
Bowl against the Chicago Bears, and it was the Colts’ running game and Bears
mistakes that decided the game. Manning was lackluster in this game and the
entire playoffs, with a surprising 70.5 passer rating, throwing 7 interceptions
and only three touchdown passes; in the Super Bowl he threw an interception and
lost a fumble. People forget that the Bears actually led 14-6, and the game was
still up for grabs until Kelvin Hayden’s 56-yard interception return for a
touchdown in the fourth quarter. Addai
and Rhodes combined for190 yards rushing, and the Colts averaged more than 150
yards rushing in four games.
By 2008, the Colts abandoned any
semblance of a rushing game, and let Manning run wild. From 2008-2010, 63
percent of their total plays were passes (and plays ending in sacks). Things
haven’t changed in Denver; it may appear that the Broncos are running the ball
in the box score, but Manning is still running pass plays 60 percent of the
time. Interestingly, in the 43-8 blowout loss to Seattle in the Super Bowl, 50
of the 64 plays Denver ran were passing. Only 27 yards were gained on the
ground, although the botched snap of -8 yards counted as a “run.”
The question is if Favre’s teams
ran the ball more frequently than Manning’s. Unfortunately, it would not be an
accurate statement. My calculations show that Favre’s teams passed on 57.7
percent of their downs, just barely below Manning’s percentage, tempered only
by the fact that Favre was sacked more often and that Manning was “forced” to
deal with credible run game weapons in his first 10 seasons. Manning’s pass
plays per game were also only slightly above Favre’s.
Between the two of them, the 2003
Packers were the only team to have more running plays than passing, 507-492.
The Packers were third in NFL in rushing, with Ahman Green setting season and
game team records; the 2558 rushing yards were also a team record (the previous
team record, 2460, was set by the 1962 squad, arguably the best in team history).
After beating Seattle in overtime in the wild card game, the Packers seemed
Super Bowl bound until the loss in overtime in the divisional round to Philadelphia,
after the infamous fourth and 26 play that the Eagles converted late. Just before
that, the Packers had been running at will on the Eagles (210 yards), and many
questioned why coach Mike Sherman chose to punt on fourth and short late in the
game in Eagles territory, leading to that aforementioned play and a game-tying
field goal.
What do the statistics suggest?
The reality is that the machine-like Manning was (and is) a more efficient
passer than the “gunslinger” Favre, a point grudgingly made. The one caveat to
note here, however, is that this does not mean Manning was more a “winner” than
Favre; the latter still has a better playoff record—13-11 compared to 11-12 for
Manning. In fact, Manning has more playoff losses than any quarterback in NFL
history—and all of those can be placed quite comfortably on his “superior” shoulders.
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