Benghazi report suggests that politics and Clinton's reputation were behind the "decisions" on diplomatic security issues

The U.S. Senate’s recently completed investigation of the Benghazi tragedy apparently didn’t satisfy many Republicans, who used it to further their own partisan political agendas. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who was only mentioned in Republican investigators final remarks, was accused of bearing ultimate responsibility for the incident, since the temporary mission facilities in which Libyan ambassador Christopher Stevens and others lost their lives following a militant attack did not meet expected security requirements, and it was the Secretary of State who had to give final clearance for the mission to be operational. It may have been that Stevens was intent on keeping the mission open despite the issues, although one wonders how much attention Clinton  paid to the many intelligence reports coming out of Libya and Benghazi--taking a more "personal" view of the situation rather than recognize the potential for trouble that could come back to haunt the administration if there was a serious security breach. Clinton did belatedly take “responsibility” for the tragedy; however, one gets the impression that she only did so to “enhance” her own reputation rather than actually believing she was “responsible.” One suspects that her many disciples certainly believe this.

At any rate, the Benghazi report details three separate attacks the night of September 11, 2012 on the mission and the CIA annex by militants likely supported by Al-Qaeda elements. Interestingly, the annex was only a seven minute drive away from the mission, but despite being notified almost immediately that that mission was under attack (9:40 PM), it took 23 minutes for the first relief force to leave. Suggestions that there was an initial “stand down” order (as had been charged by a British security operative) were not verified. A later attack on the annex at around 5:15 AM killed two Americans, and it was decided to evacuate all Americans in the vicinity, including Ambassador Stevens, whose body had initially been taken by the Libyans to a local hospital.

The investigation details several reports in the prior months concerned about the deteriorating security situation surrounding the American facilities:

June 18, 2012. The Pentagon's Joint Staff produced a slide in its daily intelligence report entitled, "(U) Terrorism: Conditions Ripe for More Attacks, Terrorist Safe Haven in Libya." In the slide, the Joint Staff assessed: support will increase Libyan terrorist capability in the permissive post-revolution security environment. Attacks will also increase in number and lethality as terrorists connect with AQ associates in Libya. Areas of eastern will become a safe haven.

July 6, 2012. CIA produced a report entitled, "Libya: Al-Qa'ida Establishing Sanctuary." In the report, CIA stated: "AI-Qa'ida-affiliated groups and associates are exploiting the permissive security environment in Libya to enhance their capabilities and expand their operational reach. This year, Muhammad Jamal's Egypt-based network, al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and ai-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have conducted training, built communication networks, and facilitated extremist travel across North Africa from their safe haven in parts of eastern Libya."

August 19, 2012. The Pentagon's Joint Staff produced a slide in its daily intelligence report entitled, "(U) Libya: Terrorists to Increase Strength During Next Six Months." In the slide, the Joint Staff stated: "There are no near-term prospects for a reversal in the trend towards a terrorist safe haven in Libya, and areas of eastern Libya will likely become a broader safe haven by the end of 2012. The conditions in Libya will allow terrorists to increase attacks against Western and Libyan interests in the country, as well as attempt attacks in the region and possibly Europe in the next six moilths."

September 5, 2012. AFRICOM produced a Theater Analysis Report entitled, "(U) Libya: Extremism in Li and Future." The report contained a map showing how are actively exploiting the open operating environment in Libya." (The map is located in Appendix IV of this report). The report also noted: "Disarray in Libya's security services, and a likely focus by authorities on pursuit of Qadhafi loyalists is likely allowing jihadists in Libya freedom to recruit, train, and facilitate the movement of fighters and weapons. The threat to Western and U.S. interests and individuals remains high, particularly in northeast Libya.

On August 15, Stevens raised the issue of the “deteriorating security situation” at an Emergency Action Committee meeting, and the concerns from this meeting were transmitted to the State Department the next day. Despite these warnings, the report noted that “few significant improvements were made by the State Department to the security posture of the Temporary Mission Facility.” Although there were the “minimum” number of agents located at the mission, these were clearly inadequate given militant activity in the area and lack of Libyan government control of “security” elements. Furthermore, there seemed to be “very real confusion over who, ultimately, was responsible and empowered to make decisions based on both policy and security concerns” which were a “potential root cause for the confusion, lack of clear lines of authority, and communication at the headquarters level.”

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Under Secretary for Management Patrick Kennedy came under fire in the report for having direct knowledge of the various reports and number of personnel on the ground, and not responding adequately (or at all) to the situation. But it was Charlene Lamb, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Programs and primarily responsible for diplomatic security arrangements, who came under the most fire in the report. Lamb's appointment to her post earlier that year was apparently opposed by many old hands in the State Department; since she had held similar smaller scale posts in the past, it is curious why they believed she was inadequately qualified. However, she was apparently a favorite of Clinton, and long-time Clinton firewall Cheryl Mills overrode their objections.

The report concluded that Lamb was “less than forthcoming” and generally unresponsive to investigators’ questions concerning how security decisions were made, particularly in regard to Libya. However, testimony by Eric Nordstrom, who until shortly before the attacks was the Regional Security Officer in Libya, was particularly damning not just about Lamb, but ultimately her boss:

…that Ms. Lamb and other senior State Department officials were unreceptive to repeated requests from the Libyan mission regarding security personnel in both Tripoli and Benghazi. According to Mr. Nordstrom, the previous U.S. Ambassador to Libya, GeneCretz, and his Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM), Joan Polaschik, traveled to Washington in mid-February 2012 to specifically ask for additional security personnel. In addition to meeting with Ms. Lamb, they met separately with Mr. Kennedy and other senior officials. Yet, when the Libyan mission transmitted its official request for additional security personnel on March 28, 2012, the push back from Ms. Lamb's office was swift and significant. While the request, which included five temporary duty Diplomatic Security agents in Benghazi, was clearly reasonable, one of Ms. Lamb's subordinates asked Mr. Nordstrom why the official cable sought "the sun, the moon, and the stars." When Mr. Nordstrom stated that he did not understand why this was an issue, the response from Ms. Lamb's office was telling: "Well, you know, this is a political game. You have to not make us look bad here, that we're not being responsive." In a disturbingly prophetic e-mail to DCM Polaschik following this exchange, Mr. Nordstrom wrote: I doubt we will ever get [Diplomatic Security] to admit in writing what I was told [in] reference [to] Benghazi that OV[International Programs] was directed by Deputy Assistant Secretary Lamb to cap the agents in Benghazi at 3, and force post to hire local drivers. This is apparently a verbal policy only but one which DSIIP/[Near Eastern Affairs] doesn't plan to violate. I hope that nobody is injured as a result of an incident in Benghazi, since it would be particularly embarrassing to both DS and DAS [Lamb] if it was a result of some sort of game they are playing. According to Mr. Nordstrom, Ms. Lamb was also vocal about her unwillingness to provide additional security personnel, including support of an extension of the Department of Defense (DoD) Site Security Team. Mr. Nordstrom told the Committee that Ms. Lamb claimed it would be embarrassing and give Libya more security agents than in Yemen and Pakistan.

One may recall that Clinton took a great deal of credit—or was given it by an overly fawning media—for the “success” of the Libyan intervention. But her key subordinate overseeing diplomatic security apparently “understood” that she was not to make Clinton “look bad” by any suggestion that diplomats there might be in danger, and that she did not want to be seen as an incompetent administrator. But there might have been more to this, though not noted in the report: That there may have been some “jealousy” by Clinton and her inner circle in regard to Stephens’ long and distinguished career as a diplomat, and she preferred to leave him to fend for himself in Benghazi.

Interestingly, Ralph Nader had this to say about Clinton’s tenure as Secretary of State: “Behind the public relations sheen, the photo-opportunities with groups of poor people in the developing world, an ever more militarized State Department operated under Clinton’s leadership.” This hard talk was hardly in evidence in regard to Benghazi; it would seem that Clinton and her political underlings preferred to leave our own diplomats there to the wolves.