The city of Seattle and the Department of Justice continue to spar over what exactly to do to reform the Seattle Police Department’s culture of abuse. The city even seems to be in denial that the SPD has an excessive force problem; I suspect that the city’s “position” is being driven behind the scenes by the police guild, and the city’s complaints about the cost of implementing the DOJ’s reform proposals are mostly contrivance to avoid confronting the guild. The city, for example, claims that implementing the 1-to-6 ratio of sergeants-to-beat cops will cost $7.3 million a year; the irony is that the amount of money paid-out to beat cops and Sheriff’s deputies for overtime has been and still is a scandal. If the DOJ proposal forces additional hiring (providing that new hires are not psychological head cases), costs might actually even-out if not decrease.
The local newspaper, which has generally taken the side of the city, was kind enough to provide PDFs of some of the back-and-forth between the city and the DOJ. The first missive, written by the City Attorney Peter Holmes, was a brief cover letter of the city’s counterproposal to the DOJ plan. The city’s “plan” is called “SPD 20/20 - A Vision For the Future,” and can be found on the Seattle.gov website. It seems rather exhausting, but in fact is rather vague and lacking in specifics, and my general impression is that it is basically a “to-do” list of additional training and record-keeping that is unlikely to be fully implemented; but at least it sounds like they are going to do “something”—or at least pretend to. The salient issue is how the SPD and the city will handle accountability. This is point number 18:
“Effective law enforcement requires the trust and support of the community. If that trust is not rebuilt, policing itself can become less effective. The Department will take steps to improve transparency and accountability. While some of these efforts are directed at sharing more information to help the community understand and assess the work of Seattle police officers, other steps are directed at extending accountability expectations beyond the complaint review process in OPA. We will:
Create and implement a transparency initiative to ensure release of information to the maximum extent allowed by law and public safety considerations
Conduct a pilot program using police body cameras
Convene a working group of stakeholders to consider and propose legislation in the next session to overcome obstacles to release of information, including body and dash cam video
Schedule and hold regular public meetings to discuss policy, training, and other high level initiatives to insure that public input is received and considered
Identify an OPA liaison at each precinct
Formalize an OPA monitoring system to oversee complaints and misconduct handled on the precinct level
Provide resources to OPA so it can tailor complaint analysis to the interests of a particular community or precinct commander, allowing for more timely and relevant reviews of complaint trends
Un-silo the Department’s OPA complaint, Early Intervention System (EIS), Use of Force and Training systems – create a system that allows for information to be shared across units and provides access for both employees and supervisors
Work to ensure that the OPA auditor has access to all data needed for policy review
Ensure that the Chief responds to each OPA Auditor and Director recommendation, and that the Auditor’s and Chief’s statements are reviewed by the Mayor”
Now, forget the fact that the OPA is and has always been a bad joke with neither backbone nor real authority. The DOJ’s principle complaint here is that the city’s proposal makes no mention of an independent monitor, nor does it countenance judicial oversight that reforms are implemented in good faith. Abuses by the SPD is nothing new, and it is easy to see that without real bite, any “reform” is toothless without effective supervision. Jonathan Smith of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division responded to the city’s “proposal” on May 16, lamenting that “there is a very dramatic gap between the parties.” In the Justice Department’s estimation, not only was the city’s proposal not serious, but it seemed unproductive to conduct discussions based on those proposals. “We are particularly surprised that the City has not included any measures to respond to the issues of discriminatory policing, community engagement, or the City’s accountability system.”
The DOJ also complained about the way the city was leaking information to the press: “We have been very discouraged by the way these negotiations have been handled by the City. To facilitate candid and meaningful dialogue, we agreed that proposals would remain confidential and both sides would refrain from negotiating ‘in the press’” However, elected leaders have apparently done some leaking anyways. “The leaks and statements have ranged from mischaracterizations of the role of the monitor (dubbed a ‘shadow chief’), and continued with flat misstatements on requirements and costs of our draft proposal from documents solely in the possession of the City. AND YESTERDAY, WE LEARNED THE PRESS WAS GIVEN THE ENTIRETY OF OUR DRAFT PROSED CONSENT DECREE together with a SPD ‘analysis.’” Again, the implication is that the city would prefer to demonize the DOJ’s efforts and avoid taking on the police guild.
In a letter dated May 23, the DOJ complained that “the positions taken by the City in negotiations are making settlement unlikely…Real solutions require a comprehensive approach, not piecemeal bartering. In light of the City’s position, we do not believe it is fruitful for the parties to meet at this juncture…the City’s proposal will not achieve reform that is measurable and enforceable. Indeed, we have gone backwards.” The DOJ again notes that the city proposes that use of force not be “subject to court oversight and independent monitoring.”
In a letter dated May 31, the city responded by saying that the DOJ proposal were “cost-prohibitive, operationally impossible, untested, inconsistent with policing best practices and harmful to police responsiveness and effectiveness.” According to who—the police who don’t want reform and want to behave as they always have? The letter, written by Carl Marquardt, who is legal counsel of the mayor, is somewhat disingenuous and evasive; the city refuses to commit or even acknowledge the DOJ’s specific areas of concern, and while it notes that the DOJ wants people at the negotiating table who have the authority to make decisions, the city’s reprehensible position seems to be that its negotiators will not conduct discussions in good faith. One would presume that the negotiators would at least be representative of the opinions of both the mayor and the city council, with input from the police representatives; instead, the city apparently wants its “negotiators” not to address the issues of police abuse at all, but try to water down any reform as much as they can. Of course, the city wants “policing experts” in the room, although given past experience with police acceptance of any kind of monitoring of their activities, this is akin to having the fox guard the chicken coop. It is easy to see the DOJ’s frustration with the city’s “position.”
At the present time, it is difficult to see how each side’s positions can be reconciled, with the DOJ wanting effective monitoring and compliance, while the city just wants police culture to work out its problems on its own, without real oversight or accountability.
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