Thoughts on the Freeh report

In the wake of the Freeh report on the Penn State University sexual abuse scandal, there has been much talk that I find of questionable value. Some commentators have been calling for the “death penalty” for the football program, and a poll or two suggests that a large majority of people would support this. However, I agree with ESPN’s John Clayton that such a penalty is not warranted; even the Freeh report does not even imply that any Penn State players past or present were involved in or knew of Jerry Sandusky’s activities; if this happened in the Mathematics Department, does that mean that it should be shut down for a few years as punishment? Meanwhile, Jason Whitlock of Fox Sports suggests that “sexism” was involved, supposedly because a female reporter and school counselor were not taken “seriously.” But it is a disservice to the real victims by bringing female “victims” into it; the real sexism at play here is that because society is not prepared to see males as “victims” in sexual and domestic abuse, such acts as Sandusky’s can go on for years without acceptance of the fact that it is occurring (of course, when an adult female does this to a 13-year-old boy, he is considered “lucky”—and we see the female pedophile given probation rather than jail time—much less the stigma of being a sexual predator).

It would also illuminate if one contemplates the question of how society views criminality by groups; O.J. Simpson, a black man, was convicted by the media within days of the murders he was accused of, while George Zimmerman, a Hispanic, has been ruthlessly demonized by the media without any consideration of the evidence in his case. Yet no one wanted to believe that the Ted Bundys, Gary Ridgeways, Debra Lafaves and Jerry Sanduskys of the world would be capable of such crimes as they were accused of; white people say “I’m not like that—but those ‘others’ are.” The same goes for the “model” minorities; recent mass killings at two colleges that were perpetrated by male students of Korean ancestry have not led to an attempt by the media to apply any cultural insinuations upon the Asian “group” like they would have, say, to Hispanics.

Anyways, I’ve tried to read the 260+ pages of the Freeh report regarding the pedophile activities of Jerry Sandusky and what Penn State University administrators did or did not do. The report is “exhaustive,” but only in the sense that it is repetitive and lacking in actual substance in many areas; two-third of the text deals with issues peripheral to the actual crimes, such as the actions of the Board of Trustees during and after the grand jury hearings, Sandusky’s retirement package, school policies, a bibliography, “exhibits” of which constitute the emails exchanged by the parties that are already discussed in the main body of the report. One thing the report does not discuss is why from 2002 and 2010 this issue seemed to be “dead”—in fact the principals involved had to refer to old notes to remember what it was all about. The fact is, while the accounts of the victims from the 1998 and 2001 incidents are quite disturbing , it appears that the particulars only came to light during grand jury testimony and Sandusky’s recent trial, which is referred to several times in the report; there is no evidence that the school president Graham Spanier, Vice President Gary Schultz, Athletic Director Timothy Curley and football coach Joe Paterno were aware of the full extent of Sandusky’s criminality. That is not to absolve them of responsibility, far from it; they were certainly guilty of not wanting to know the whole truth, and basing their actions on that deliberate ignorance.

The Freeh report decries the lack of “empathy” for Sandusky’s victims. Yet the emails provided as evidence indicates that Spanier, Schultz and Curley were concerned enough not to interfere with the activities of police, prosecutors or psychologists in the case; none of the people involved in investigating the case were pressured by school authorities to try to soft-pedal Sandusky’s actions. That police and prosecutors who decided that no crime had been committed in the 1998 incident did so on their own volition, and why they reached such a conclusion, was apparently not within the purview of the Freeh report—despite the fact it was critical to understanding what administrators thought was their responsibility. Again, Spanier, Schultz and Curley cannot escape censure because they could have taken much more forceful action than they did, such as banning Sandusky permanently from school facilities—which the Freeh report claims could have prevented some of Sandusky’s predation. On the other hand, it is reckless to assume that they didn’t believe the accusations as they were reported to them (not by the victims themselves, but by third-parties), or thought that they warranted no action. The report shows that the accused administrators repeatedly warned Sandusky that his actions—alleged at the time and not “criminal” per police and prosecutors—were improper and would not be tolerated. They informed Second Mile administrators about the accusations. What Spanier, Schultz and Curley were most guilty of, as one of them noted in an email, was not going public with the accusations against Sandusky. They allowed police and prosecutors to “handle” the case, when crimes of a sexual nature tend to more “explosive” than most—even murder.

Paterno’s involvement is problematic to deduce. He was informed of the initial 1998 incident and apparently “anxious” to be kept informed. People should remember that Sandusky was a “revered” figure in the coaching business, not just at Penn State but nationally. We can interpret Paterno’s “anxiety” as wanting to know all of the facts, but at the same time hoping that they were not as “explosive” as they would turn out to be. Sandusky had at that time “retired” from coaching, but would come back for another year for his 30^th year as an employee with university, apparently for greater retirement benefits. That the university did give Sandusky a generous retirement package with many perks makes it seems highly unlikely that it would have done so if it had reason to believe that Sandusky was involved in something much more serious than was later revealed. But before we go into Paterno’s culpability, let’s hold back and see what exactly is here.

Spanier, Schultz, Curley and Paterno were accused of concealing “critical facts,” and a “striking lack of empathy” for the victims. The Board of Trustees was also accused of failing to exercise its oversight functions, and a failure of the Board to make a “reasonable inquiry” when the story broke in 2011—“by not demanding details about the nature and direction of the grand jury investigation and the university’s response to the investigation.” This failure was enabled by “a president (Spanier) who discouraged discussion and dissent,” and by “a lack of awareness of child abuse issues, the Clery Act, and the whistleblower policies and protections.” Such was the alleged callousness of the administrators that “a decision…to allow Sandusky to retire in 1999, not as a suspected child predator, but as a valued member of the Penn State football legacy.” As for the football program itself, its staff was not “trained in their Clery Act responsibilities and most had never heard of the Clery Act.” Finally, “a culture of reverence for the football program that is ingrained at all levels of the campus community.”

These latter were hardly crimes, and it was patently unfair for the Freeh report to make a blanket accusation against the whole program for the crimes of one man, especially when the report offered no evidence to suggest that any football player even heard rumors of—let alone was involved in—Sandusky’s “extracurricular” activities. This is hyperbole for media consumption. But I digress.

According to the report, between 1995 and 1998 “several staff members and football coaches regularly observed Sandusky showering with young boys” in the Lasch Building (a football facility)…None of the individuals interviewed by the Special Investigative Counsel notified their superiors of this behavior.” A former coach testified that “he often saw Sandusky in the showers with children in the football facilities but he did not believe the practice was improper.” However, a “Centre County jury convicted Sandusky in June 2012 of assaulting three different boys before May 1998.” One adult male stated that he had been “molested by Sandusky over 100 times as a child…Sandusky brought him to the Penn State football locker room showers where Sandusky fondled him and performed oral sex on him.” Yet before the 1998 incident, the behavior of Sandusky—who was associated with the university since he was a student in 1962—did not raise any red flags. Sandusky’s colleagues knew that he “worked” with youth at his Second Mile camp; perhaps because they themselves felt no sexual impulse toward other males—let alone boys—this simply did not register with them. If they saw Sandusky engaged in unmistakably deviant sexual behavior with the boys, that was crossing a line. But apparently they did not, or chose not to.

This changed in 1998, if only in degree. The testimony of the victim of the 1998 incident makes a description of “inappropriate” sound mild. After wrestling with the boy in the Lasch Building, the boy agreed to take a shower with Sandusky: “While in the shower, Sandusky wrapped his hands around the boy’s chest and said, ‘I’m gonna squeeze your guts out.’ The boy then washed his body and hair. Sandusky lifted the boy to “get the soap out of’ the boy’s hair, bringing the boy’s feet ‘up pretty high’ near Sandusky;s waist. The boy’s back was touching Sandusky’s chest and his feet touched Sandusky’s thigh. The boy felt ‘weird’ and ‘uncomfortable’ during the time in the shower.”

Noting his wet hair and odd behavior after returning home, the boy’s mother called a university psychologist who was already treating him for undisclosed reasons. The mother was assured she was not “overreacting,” and should contact police. The boy would say that “he did not want to get Sandusky in trouble, and that he “must not have meant anything by his actions. The boy did not want anyone to talk to Sandusky because he might not invite him to any more games.” The psychologist sent a report to the Pennsylvania child abuse line, and her colleagues “agreed that the incidents meet all of our definitions…of a pedophile’s pattern of building trust and gradual introduction of physical touch, within a context of a loving, special relationship.”

But a second evaluation by the Department of Public Welfare, however, decided that the boy did not feel coerced into any activity, and because the boy “did not voice discomfort to Sandusky…there seems to be no incident which could be termed as sexual abuse, nor did there appear to be any sequential pattern of logic and behavior that is usually consistent with adults who have difficulty with sexual abuse of children…the report ruled out that the boy had been placed in a situation where he was groomed for future sexual victimization.” It was recommended that “someone speak with Sandusky about what is acceptable with young children and explained ‘The intent of the conversation with Mr. Sandusky is not to cast dispersion upon his actions but to help him stay out of such gray situations in the future.” It is clear that there was “confusion” about what exactly Sandusky had done to the boy. The police were not exactly pawns of the university in this case; they were concerned enough about interference from the “Old Main”—meaning the university—in their investigation that they surreptitiously engaged in two “spy” operations during which they hid inside the home of the boy in order to eavesdrop on Sandusky when he was “invited” by the boy’s mother to discuss her concerns. Sandusky was also interrogated by police; his story was similar to the boy’s, and insisted that nothing “sexual” had occurred with the boy or any other boys he had showered with. The police discussed the matter with a local prosecutor, and all decided that no charge was “warranted.” In fact, the police did not even enter a notation about the incident in their blotter report.

Although the accused did not interfere with the investigation, they were notified of its progress. Schultz was informed of the investigation and notified Spanier and Curley. Schultz wonders “Is this opening of a Pandora’s box?” Are there other children involved? Curley notified Paterno, who was as noted was “anxious to know where it stands.” Spanier, however, did not notify the Board of Trustees about the investigation. Apparently he found this “unnecessary,” because the district attorney declined to bring charges against Sandusky. Sandusky is told not to shower with another boy again. He agreed that he wouldn’t. Still, ”Sandusky was advised that there was no criminal behavior established and the matter was closed as an investigation.”

We have to ask ourselves at this point if police and prosecutors decided that no crime was committed, was it the responsibility of administrators to make this public? We can say that any hint of “inappropriate” behavior warrants at least a termination of ties with the university, but apparently the accused wanted to do the “humane” thing and not create a media circus if none was warranted. Again we have to note what the administrators knew. Curley and Schultz—who we must remember were not witnesses to events and could only rely on what they were told—were acting on what they claimed were vague accusations that were at best “inappropriate,” but they did not want to make public accusations that may not be true. We live in an age where sex scandals are all the rage, and even when found to be untrue—such as in Tawana Brawley and the Duke University cases—untold harm can be done to innocent parties. One may recall that campus feminist organizations posted the photos of all the lacrosse players all over the Duke campus, with a blatant disregard for due process or the actual guilt of the players. Paterno would tell a reporter “I didn’t know exactly how to handle it and I was afraid to jeopardize what the university procedure was. So I backed away and turned it over to some other people, people I thought would have a little more expertise than I did. It didn’t work out that way.” Spanier would also claim he never heard a report from anyone that Sandusky was engaged in any sexual abuse of children.

What we know now is 90 percent hindsight; we can assume that Penn State administrators should have known what Sandusky was up to, or if not, they should have acted without the hindrance of due process. In the 1998 incident, due process was followed, and it ended with Sandusky acting “inappropriately,” but apparently nothing “criminal.”

In the fall of 2000, the Freeh report notes that a university janitor saw Sandusky sexually assault a young boy in the East Area Locker Building; Sandusky had a boy “pinned against a wall and was performing oral sex on him.” The two were later seen together in the shower, and afterwards leaving the locker room holding hands. After a discussion with other janitors, and fearing being fired they did not report the incident. Given the current chronology of events, the actions of the accused can only be seen by their ignorance of the extent of Sandusky’s activities. Again, it is hindsight that we can now see that Sandusky was a pedophile who could not restrain himself.

But in 2001, then graduate assistant Michael McQueary observed Sandusky involved in “sexual activity” with a boy in the coach’s shower room in the Lasch Building; he would later say it appeared to involve intercourse, but the story he told was not “certain” about this at the time. He did not hear “protests, screaming or yelling.” What he saw was from the reflection of a mirror; he moved away, and slammed a locker door to let them know someone else was present, at which point the activity ceased. The next day McQueary discussed the incident with Paterno. However, it is not clear what McQueary told him, although Paterno thought he acted in an “agitated” fashion. McQueary did not provide details, nor did Paterno ask him for any. The allegations did not come across as “serious” according to Paterno. The word that was passed on was the two were engaged in “horseplay,” and that Sandusky had done this to other boys, who had apparently had not complained about it at time.

Paterno informed Curley and Schultz. Schultz consulted with university counsel Wendell Courtney concerning “suspected child abuse.” Spanier, Schultz and Curley discussed the situation, and Curley decided to discuss the issue with Paterno before speaking with Sandusky. In an email, Schultz states that “Unless he confesses to having a problem (Curley) will indicate we need to have DPW review the matter as an independent agency concerned with child welfare.” Schultz obtained the 1998 police report to review similarities in the two cases, and met with Spanier and Curley to devise an “action plan”: “Tell chairman of the board of Second Mile. Report to Dept. of Welfare. Tell Sandusky to avoid bringing children alone into Lasch Bldg.” Again, if the accused are guilty of anything, it is not because they wanted to “cover-up” Sandusky’s crimes, but wanted to go through the proper “channels” in regard to something they themselves had no “expertise” in—especially in regard to the sexual assault of boys.

However, Curley changed his mind about the plan “after more thought and talking it over with Paterno.” He proposes to tell Sandusky “we feel there is a problem” and he needs “professional help.” If he is “cooperative, we would work with him to handle informing” Second Mile. If not, “we don’t have a choice and will inform” DPW and the Second Mile. “Additionally, I will let him know that his guests are not permitted to use our facilities.”

Now we have a problem, besides his (potential) victims regarded as merely “guests.” This is where Paterno seriously errs. Before, the administrators intended to inform the DPW regardless, but after a discussion with Paterno, they decide to hold off on reporting the incident not just to the department, but Second Mile—so long as Sandusky voluntarily seeks “professional help.” Spanier agrees to the plan, but fears that this leaves them vulnerable for not reporting it openly. But it “is humane and a reasonable way to proceed.” For who?

Curley then informs Sandusky that they were “uncomfortable about the incident and would report it to the Second Mile.” Sandusky had “offered to provide the name of the boy…but Curley did not want the boy’s name.” However, since Sandusky does not believe he has a “problem,” the incident is discussed with the director of the Second Mile, who, however, “concludes the matter is a ‘non-incident’ and takes no further action.” Spanier, meanwhile continues to keep the matter quiet when reporting to the Board of Trustees. A few months later Sandusky, apparently ignoring demands that he stop bringing in youths on university property, is alleged to have assaulted another boy in the Lasch Building shower; it is not known if the accused administrators were aware of this incident.

Years passed before Sandusky’s victims came forward themselves with their allegations to police. In 2010, “The university receives subpoenas from the Pennsylvania Attorney General for personnel records and correspondence regarding Sandusky.” The Board of Trustees becomes involved, requesting information concerning the grand jury investigation. It was assured it was minor, and nothing would come of it. Later, trustees complained that they were ill-informed and that it wasn’t properly explained why four Penn State officials were subpoenaed if this didn’t involve the school. Trustees complained that “Spanier thought he could fix anything.” Some thought that Spanier, Schultz and Curley should be relieved immediately of their positions, but others thought it not necessary. One thought that not enough attention was given to the victims or the harm done by Sandusky. Nevertheless, the board was criticized for its own reluctance to ascertain all of the facts. Once the grand jury report was released, the fallout saw Spanier removed as president, Schultz forced to “retire,” Curley was put on administrative leave, and Paterno was fired as coach.

As I mentioned before, the greater part of the report seems little more than filler, focusing less on the victims than on university officials and what they did or did not do, and discussing at great length the policies that they university should have implemented. It is unlikely that Penn State is the only university where officials are not aware of the Clery Act, which instructs schools to keep records on all campus crimes; UW apparently does, and a 2007 story in the Times noted that the previous year six sexual assaults were reported, none leading to charges (yet you see leaflets posted in the student union proclaiming the “epidemic” of sexual assaults on female students). The report criticized the failure of those in the know to control Sandusky’s access to the university’s facilities; he was provided a key for, and continued to work out in, the Lasch Building until Nov. 2011. Despite the allegations, Sandusky was still allowed to run a football camp for youth without proper oversight or regulation. The report claimed that if the university had not permitted Sandusky to use their facilities, some of these acts would have been prevented.

When looking at the Penn State scandal, it is easy to forget that we are looking at flawed individuals who were trying to do what they thought was “best” at the time. They didn’t have all the information available to them that would later appear in the grand jury findings. It is in hindsight that they were expected to comprehend the incomprehensible—that a nationally-respected member of their university was a pedophile. If Sandusky had been involved with young girls, that was a crime they could understand, and it was obvious that they would have to take swift and deliberate action. But young boys? The thought of an adult male performing sodomy on a boy was just too hard to comprehend, and the mind preferred some alternative explanation. The one they found was that Sandusky was engaged in “horseplay”—inappropriate, but not “criminal.” It was only later when more victims came forward with specific details of what happened to them that such a fantasy could not be sustained.

What about Paterno? The Freeh report is surprisingly sparse on specifics on what Paterno’s own views were on the matter. There are no emails written by him, and save for one quote given to a newspaper reporter, everything we learn in the report are vague second-hand insinuations. The entire accusation against Paterno is based on assumptions about what he should or shouldn’t have done. We may judge Paterno guilty of purposeful ignorance in regard to the full extent of Sandusky’s activities, of wanting to “pass the buck” to his nominal superiors. People who assume that Paterno was “God” and that he could have simply ordered the university to do his bidding, such as cut ties with Sandusky, or going public with accusations not “proven” to be criminal do not take into account that university officials would likely overrule him for the “good” of the university. Nevertheless, the fact that Paterno did apparently seek to keep the issue under wraps by suggesting that Sandusky receive “professional help” in lieu notifying the DPW after the 2001 incident tells us that he had a misguided notion that Sandusky merely had an “illness” that was “treatable.” Since he and his fellow “conspirators” didn’t comprehend—or didn’t want to comprehend—the full breath of Sandusky’s crimes, they also didn’t fully comprehend the level of public fallout once those crimes were fully exposed.