Since the local newspaper reminded me that this July 4 was 149 years and a day removed from the end of the Battle of Gettysburg, I think I might take this opportunity to dare the gods of cherished American myths and suggest some revisionist history: In my humble opinion, the most overrated general in history in one Robert E. Lee. Now, I’m not saying he was actually the worst general of all-time, or even incompetent. I will even grant that a careful reading of history will show that Lee benefited from often dim-witted opposing generals, who always appeared to be overawed by his reputation, and never seemed to believe that they had enough troops to face him on the field.
But the record also shows that while Lee had strategic vision, as a tactician he was lacking, demonstrated by his failure to provide clear guidance to his corps commanders, who often had to guess at his intentions—which often created contradictory and confused actions by his generals, who would fail to act in concert; this was an especially critical failure at Gettysburg, the South’s last, best chance to “win” the war (it may be well noted that Lee’s first command, in West Virginia, ended badly; he demonstrated an inability to control bickering subordinates and function in adverse conditions). Lee’s comment after Gettysburg, “I thought that my men were invincible” suggests that he believed that his soldiers were so superior to Union soldiers (in fact one British observer traveling with Lee’s army, Arthur Fremantle, marveled how the Confederates at every level behaved as if they had won the battle, when the evidence of defeat was everywhere), that they merely had to be pointed in the direction of the enemy to prevail. This belief led to the squandering of the cream of the Confederate army at Gettysburg, the loss of which--combined with the death of Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson by friendly fire at Chancellorsville--it would never recover from.
It is also interesting to note that Lee’s most notable victories—the Seven Days, the Second Battle of Bull Run and Chancellorsville—were not possible without the indispensable abilities of “Stonewall” Jackson, who virtually alone among Lee’s corps commanders could “divine” his intentions, and was also a brilliant tactician. Jackson’s Shenandoah Valley campaign and the capture of over 12,000 Union troops at Harpers Ferry was also evidence of his capacity to operate independently with successes that more than rivaled Lee's.
After Gettysburg, Lee permanently lost the initiative. Although eventual defeat may or may not have been inevitable, the lack of manpower and material relative to the North need not necessarily be a predictor of that defeat, since the South had the advantage of defending along interior lines, which required a significant numerical advantage by an invading force to be successful. Lee was also fortunate that his counterparts, like George McClellan, Ambrose Burnside and Joe Hooker, tended to believe that his forces were much bigger than they actually were; at Antietam, McClellan refused to commit troops that almost certainly would have routed the rebel army, because of this irrational fear. Ulysses S. Grant, however, never doubted his army possessed the manpower and resources to eventually defeat Lee, and seldom shied from using it. Had Grant been in command of the Army of the Potomac in 1862, the war may have been over a year earlier. Although Lee the army engineer knew how to construct defensive positions, if Grant could not take those positions, he merely bypassed them on his way Richmond; his predecessors would merely have turned tail, and this was something that Lee had always banked on.
This is not to say that Lee doesn’t deserve his place in American lore; he is the symbol of the “lost cause” South, of nobility, gallantry and all that. But his reputation as a general is overblown; but since there is a need for martial heroes and symbols to buoy the spirits of the losers, Lee’s reputation will likely remain unblemished for posterity.
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