The U.S.- Iran relationship is the international version of Hatfields and McCoys

 

The U.S.-Iran relationship has seemed like the international version of Hatfields and McCoys; because of some wrong that occurred in the distant past, the self-perceived wronged party poisons the minds of the entire clan against the other clan, and the threat of violent tit-for-tat is always present. One clan wants to let bygones be bygones and be at least “civil” to each other, but the other clan has that “feeling good about feeling bad” syndrome that is now part of its core identity. While the U.S. claims to want only an Iran that is a “responsible” player in the world and would be quite happy to reach some kind rapprochement with its regime, Iran’s religious leaders and fanatical “revolutionary guard” remain committed to propping themselves up with propaganda about the Western bogeymen, with the U.S. the principle threat to its survival.

In this country, we may see the release on Iranian state-run television a “dramatization” of a “revolutionary guard” force invading and sacking Washington D.C. a bit on the juvenile side, but then again, it is typical of a lesser “power” to dream about outsized revenge for the assassination in Iraq of one its top generals, albeit one who was a legitimate target. Donald Trump certainly didn’t help the situation by vacating the nuclear deal without first consulting with other signatories to the agreement, none who follow his lead. Trump’s actions only strengthened the anti-U.S. element in the Iran and created rationalizations for not abiding by the letter the treaty, and with upcoming elections that promise to strengthen the hardline element over “moderates” like current Iranian president Hassan Rouhani, time is running out for both Iranian “moderates” and the Biden administration to find “common ground”—which the hardline anti-Iran element like John Bolton and Mike Pompeo in the Trump administration failed to even try to get a jump-start on.

I remember the hostage crisis in 1979, when a more radical element stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran. The embassy had warned Pres. Jimmy Carter not to allow the terminally-ill Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi—the recently deposed shah of Iran—from entering the U.S. for treatment, given the anger Iranians were already feeling because of U.S. supporting the long-unpopular shah, who was accused of human rights violations in the country. Current U.S. support for democratic governments in Iraq and Afghanistan is in fact not the typical international behavior of this country; in the past, it has worked to depose popular democratic governments in Central and Latin America in favor of right-wing, authoritarian regimes—and it was no different for Iran.

The CIA worked with the British behind the back of Pres. Harry Truman to undermine the democratic regime of Iranian prime minister Mohammed Mossadeq in the early 1950s, and with approval of Pres. Dwight Eisenhower helped stage a coup that put the shah back in power as a reliable ally of the U.S. The reason for the coup was cynical enough: the British controlled Iranian oil production and took most of the profits for itself, and Mossedeq had announced his intention to nationalize Iran’s oil production. While the shah was a staunch friend to the U.S., few average citizens in Iran forgot the U.S.’ complicity in overthrowing a popularly-elected government, and bankrolling the shah’s power. 

The shah’s bitterest foe was the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who opposed Western influence in the country and demanded a return to Islamic rule. He was arrested and imprisoned, but following widespread anti-government rioting he was exiled to Iraq, where he continued to be a thorn in the side of both the Iranian and Sunni Iraqi regimes, and when Saddam Hussein kicked Khomeini out of the country in 1978, he settled in France briefly. This set-off more anti-government rioting, and in January 1979 the shah was deposed and he left the country. Khomeini returned to Iran the next month, and he proceeded to execute hundreds of former members of the shah’s government and its supporters, and established an Islamic state which was anti-U.S. to the core—it is the “Great Satan”—and remains so today.

All of this could have been avoided, of course. Until the 1950s, most Iranians considered the U.S. a friend to its sovereignty against the predations of Russia/Soviet Union and the British. Successive Iranian regimes sought American help to modernize its economy in the early 20^th Century. Financier Morgan Shuster was brought in to be the official government treasurer, and in his capacity as a private citizen and not as an agent of the U.S. government, he supported the democratic revolution in Iran until he was forced out by Russian and British interests.

But in general the U.S. had little interest in the domestic concerns of Iran until it felt obliged to support British control over  Iranian oil, and to support a new regime that would be a reliable ally in the Cold War, given Iran's strategic position bordering the Soviet Union, before Turkmenistan became “independent.” The U.S. might have benefited had it not intervened in Iranian affairs and not propped-up the unpopular shah; however, one must remember that the U.S. had no interest in Afghanistan—whose attempts at constitutional government failed on its own—until the country became so chaotic that it gave the Soviet Union an opening to invade the country—and from there, becoming a haven for Al-Qaeda terrorists.

It also should be pointed out that Iran didn’t start its nuclear program from scratch; it had been in existence since the 1950s with the technical assistance of the U.S.; why the U.S. did this in an oil-rich country is not clear, but it has had the consequences we are seeing now.  

Meanwhile the gamesmanship between the two countries continues, particularly with tit-for-tat actions in the Persian Gulf, the revolutionary guard “mistakenly” shooting down civilian airliners, and Iran supporting any international player who makes things difficult for the U.S. and Israel. For most Americans, Iran is getting to be a very old story; but as the Atlantic Council pointed out, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei “doesn’t want détente with the U.S.—ever.” After the 2015 agreement, Rouhani suggested that there was a “possibility” of the U.S. and Iran resuming diplomatic relations, but Khamenei quickly shot down any such notion, asserting that once the “Great Satan” had been “expelled” from the country, it should never be allowed back in again. Of course that doesn’t mean that the two countries can’t occasionally scratch each other’s back, as we learned from the Iran-Contra scandal.

So that is where we are at with Iran; only regime change at the top in Iran will bring “peace” between the two countries, and that may only happen if the people there become frustrated enough to start another revolution. The current regime has remained in power because it allows the “façade” of something that looks on the outside like “democracy,” but Iran is like any authoritarian regime where the people are allowed a “voice”—but one that is only heard at the pleasure of the “supreme leader.” For now, the U.S. has to treat Iran as that annoying kid who won’t stop throwing fire crackers at you at the beach no matter how often you chase them away.