Playing "by the rules" is not part of China's game plan

Most people in this country have no idea what kind of country China “used” to be. Mass murder—euphemistically called “purges”—during Russia’s Stalinist period are well-known; less well known are those that occurred during the first few decades of Mao Tse-tung’s rule over China. Tens of millions were killed, first during the initial “purification” of the country in the following the defeat of the Nationalist government in 1949, then during the “Great Leap Forward”—the “industrialization” of the country through communalization that went awry and was an economic disaster—and then during the “Cultural Revolution,” in which Mao blamed this failure on the lack of ideological purity and undertook extensive “purges” in order to restore commitment to his own personal philosophy of Communism. 

Despite the fact that since the end of the Chinese civil war the U.S. and China had no diplomatic relations, Chinese hostility toward the Soviet Union during the 1960s—due not to perceived abuses in the latter’s Communist system, but because it was viewed as an “unreliable” partner in maintaining the system—China became more “open” to re-establishing diplomatic relations with this country, although it had to be done secretly and delicately given the years of anti-American propaganda. The U.S. lifted trade and travel restrictions to China in 1971, and so-called “ping-pong diplomacy” allowed for low-level “cultural” interaction between the two countries before Richard Nixon’s  official visit to China in 1972, normalizing relations between the two countries and effectively isolating Taiwan internationally.For Nixon, this cemented his reputation of having a “great” record in foreign affairs, although his policies in Africa and Latin America might call this assertion into question. 

There is no doubt now that the greatest beneficiary of China’s re-entry into the world stage has been China itself, and no more so in free market trade. Countries all over the world have allowed Chinese-made goods to take unfair advantage of their own domestic markets—particularly in countries with generally higher standards of living, but also because of the higher costs of domestic manufacturing, which is unable to compete with lower-cost Chinese-made goods. Countries with struggling economies, such as in Latin America and Africa, have lost markets to the Chinese—yet nevertheless agree to give China “sweet” deals to exploit their natural resources. 

In the United States, there is an imperfect “balance” between paying (relatively) low wages and cheaper goods made in China. While the Bush administration conducted its wars, cut taxes for the rich and put greater burdens on the poor as the gulf between the wealthy and everyone else grew, three million manufacturing jobs were lost, largely to China. Yet China remains on the U.S.’ “Most Favored Nation” trade list—despite a clear lack of reciprocity on the part of China, which maintains a massive positive trade imbalance despite having a far larger market for U.S.-made goods.   

This free ride on the world economy has bred a certain arrogance in China. While to Western apologists for China, like Martin Jacques (author of When China Rules the World) and Kenneth  Lieberthal (who is the Encyclopaedia Britannica’s principle “expert” on the country) it  is just a “misunderstood” country that believes in “unity” above all else (as opposed to the West’s  multi-political systems)  and that “China has by and large avoided disputes and encouraged the peaceful evolution of events in Asia” and has become “an advocate of arms control and assumed a more-constructive, less-combative stance in many international organizations,” this thought is clearly contradicted by efforts by China to encroach on the sovereignty of Japan and the Philippines, particularly in regard to its efforts to control potential oil deposits in the South China Sea. 

China is also building a huge navy, and pipelines are being built in numerous neighboring countries to maintain energy security and avoid the potential of international and diplomatic pressure. Conflict seems inevitable, and China’s massive espionage efforts against the U.S.—masquerading as being conducted by “private” persons and companies—demonstrate its intentions well enough.

China’s refusal to play by international rules is particularly prevalent in its quest for oil. Multi-national oil companies have frequently been losers in competition against government-backed Chinese oil “companies,” which can afford to offer big money “perks” and do not come with “conditions,” such as abiding by internationally accepted standards of behavior, which those countries who are the recipients obviously find especially appealing when considering whether to deal with China or the West. China, which has a veto in the UN Security Council, has repeatedly weakened or opposed actions against Iran and Sudan (in regard to Darfur), due to advantageous deals it receives for oil in those countries.

The Chinese have also been accused of buying not just excess oil, but of productive capacity of oil. No one in the West and particularly the U.S. should be under any illusions about the danger this creates: Controlling the production of oil means the ability to reserve it for themselves, in times of economic stress and shortages—and with it the ability to use to blackmail the U.S. and Europe diplomatically, and even dangerously disrupt the economies of the West, if it so choose to do so. In that circumstance, the potential for military conflict with China is obviously enlarged.

We can all sit back and pretend that the potential for armed conflict with China is overblown and that it will eventually agree to “play by the rules.” But because dissent in China is subject to government crackdown, and the country pursues policy that is indifferent to international standards, there should be no illusions that allows naiveté about the possibilities.