The U.S Senate Intelligence Committee’s fifth and final report on Russian interference in the 2016 election was just released, and unlike Devin Nunes’ highly partisan House report, it does Donald Trump and his underlings few favors. Among other things, it provides a scathing assessment of Paul Manafort’s activities on behalf of Russian intelligence, the at the very least naiveté of the likes of Jared Kushner and Donald Trump Jr. in allowing themselves to be used by Russian operatives—if in fact that were not actually colluding with the Russians—and while expressing skepticism about the Steele dossier, it did not completely discount the possibility that where there was smoke, there may have been fire. While in the Durham investigation an FBI lawyer has pleaded guilty by adding the word “not” to a FISA warrant application, with the Senate report we are again confronted with Trump and William Barr trying to say that a mole hill is the same as a mountain.
The essentials of the report directly contradict what the Trump administration and Fox News has been peddling:
The Committee found that the Russian government engaged in an aggressive, multifaceted effort to influence, or attempt to influence, the outcome of the 2016 presidential election.
The report indicates that Paul Manafort dealt with Russian operatives first for personal profit, and then used those connections for Trump’s political gain:
Paul Manafort's connections to Russia and Ukraine began in approximately late 2004 with the start of his work for Oleg Deripaska and other Russia-aligned oligarchs in Ukraine. The Committee found that Deripaska conducts influence operations, frequently in countries where he has a significant economic interest. The Russian government coordinates with and directs Deripaska on many of his influence operations.
From approximately 2004 to 2009, Manafort implemented these influence operations on behalf ofDeripaska, including a broad, multi-million dollar political influence campaign directed at numerous countries of interest to Deripaska and the Russian government. ProRussian Ukrainian oligarchs with deep economic ties to Russia also paid Manafort tens of millions of dollars and formed strong ties with Manafort independent of Deripaska.
Manafort hired and worked increasingly closely with a Russian national, Konstantin Kilimnik. Kilimnik is a Russian intelligence officer. Kilimnik became an integral part of Manafort's operations in Ukraine and Russia, serving as Manafort's primary liaison to Deripaska and eventually managing Manafort's office in Kyiv. Kilimnik and Manafort formed a close and lasting relationship that endured to the 2016 U.S. elections. and beyond. Prior to joining the Trump Campaign in March 2016 and continuing throughout his time 6n the Campaign, Manafort directly and indirectly communicated with Kilimnik, Deripaska, and the pro-Russian oligarchs in Ukraine. On numerous occasions, Manafort sought to secretly share internal Campaign information with Kilimnik.
Interestingly, it seems that at least the majority Republicans on the committee were unwilling to make a definitive conclusion about what Russian intelligence intended to do with the “sensitive” polling data provided by Manafort, only admitting that it “obtained some information suggesting Kilimnik may have been connected to the GRU's hack and leak operation targeting the 2016 U.S. election.” But whatever the Russian intentions were, Manafort’s relationship with Russian intelligence operatives while serving in the Trump campaign “created opportunities for Russian intelligence services to exert influence over” the Trump Campaign, and that Manafort’s “willingness to share information with individuals closely affiliated with the Russian intelligence services, particularly Kilimnik and associates of Oleg Deripaska, represented a grave counterintelligence threat.”
The Committee found no reason to believe the denials that Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly told and Trump accepted without hesitation:
Putin ordered the Russian effort to hack computer networks and accounts affiliated with the Democratic Party and leak information damaging to Hillary Clinton and her campaign for president. Moscow's intent was to harm the Clinton Campaign, tarnish an expected Clinton presidential administration, help the Trump Campaign after Trump became the presumptive Republican nominee, and undermine the U.S. democratic process.
The Committee also confirmed that “Wikileaks actively sought, and played, a key role in the Russian influence, very likely knew it was assisting a Russian intelligence influence effort.” It also found that the Trump campaign was a more than willing “partner” in maintaining a constant flow of the illegal hacking operation so long as it helped Trump:
While the GRU and WikiLeaks were releasing hacked documents, the Trump Campaign sought to maximize the impact of those leaks to aid Trump's electoral prospects. Staff on the Trump Campaign sought advance notice about WikiLeaks releases, created messaging strategies to promote and share the materials in anticipation of and following their release, and encouraged further leaks. The Trump Campaign publicly undermined the attribution of the hack-and-leak campaign to Russia and was indifferent to whether it and WikiLeaks were furthering a Russian election interference effort.
But again the Committee’s majority refused to draw the obvious conclusions, insisting that they could find no definitive “evidence that Campaign officials received an authoritative government notification that the hack was perpetrated by the Russian government before October 7, 2016”—this in spite of the fact that the media had been reporting on the involvement of “Russian actors” for many months prior to that date, so the Trump campaign could not have been ignorant of this.
The Committee also investigated Roger Stone’s connections, finding that he served as a reliable conduit for both “Trump and senior Campaign officials” seeking “advance information about WikiLeaks's planned releases.” Yet once again the majority opinion demurred on whether or not Stone actually provided information to the campaign that was not already publicly known. Given that Stone was convicted of perjuring himself, it is likely the Committee did receive truthful answers from Stone.
The Committee also looked into Trump’s connections with Russian oligarch Aras Agalarov and his son, which at least initially was focused on the effort to build a Trump Tower in Moscow, which never got off the ground. The Committee also looked into Aras Agalarov involvement in setting up the June, 2016 Trump Tower meeting, in which “dirt” on Hillary Clinton was to be divulged “between Natalia Veselnitskaya and senior members of the Campaign and for a second meeting following the election, also with Veselnitskaya, that did not take place. Agalarov likely did this on behalf of individuals affiliated with the Russian government, judging from his ties with Russian officials who have pursued a repeal of the U.S. sanctions under the Magnitsky Act.” It was obvious that a “quid pro quo” was being sought, although the Committee did not make this conclusion.
However, the Committee “found evidence suggesting that it was the 'intent of the Campaign · participants in the June 9, 2016 meeting, particularly Donald Trump Jr., to receive derogatory information that would be of benefit to the Campaign from a source known, at least by Trump Jr., to have connections to the Russian government.” The Committee “found no reliable evidence that information of benefit to the Campaign was transmitted at the meeting, or that then candidate Trump had foreknowledge of the meeting. Participants on both sides of the meeting were ultimately disappointed with how it transpired.” Yet the fact remains that both sides did expect something of benefit to happen, and that is the important thing; just because nothing of benefit did happen does not take away from the at least unethical and probably illegal intent of the meeting. That is what people keep forgetting.
However, the Committee did find that two of the participants, “Veselnitskaya and Rinat Akhmetshin, have significant connections to the Russian government, including the Russian intelligence services. The connections the Committee uncovered, particularly regarding Veselnitskaya, were far more extensive and concerning than what had been publicly known, and neither Veselnitskaya nor Akhmetshin were forthcoming with the Committee regarding those connections. Both Veselnitskaya and Akhmetshin may have sought, in some cases, to obfuscate the true intent of their work in the United States”—meaning they likely perjured themselves concerning their espionage activities in this country, which the Trump campaign “naively” was willing to cooperate with.
The Committee found evidence that Trump was still busy pursuing his Moscow Trump Tower deal during the campaign, handled mainly by Michael Cohen. Trump hoped to make “hundreds of millions of dollars” if the deal went through. Furthermore, “While these negotiations were ongoing, Trump made positive public comments about Putin in connection with his presidential campaign. Cohen and (Trump business associate Felix) Sater sought to leverage Trump's comments, and subsequent comments about Trump by Putin, to advance the deal.” However, by the summer of 2016 dealing abruptly stopped, reasons not quite clear, but perhaps due to fears that it might hurt the campaign. What was clear was that many Russian officials—including Putin—had some personal dealings (at least through Cohen) with Trump that could be exploited for Russia’s benefit.
George Papadopoulos was another egoistic but “naïve” Trump campaign functionary whose efforts “introduced him to several individuals that raise counterintelligence concerns, due to their associations with individuals from hostile foreign governments as well as actions these individuals undertook. The Committee assesses that Papadopoulos was not a witting cooptee of the Russian intelligence services, but nonetheless presented a prime intelligence target and potential vector for malign Russian influence.” On the other hand, the Committee found no evidence of substance that Carter Page was anything more than a braggart who few in the campaign took seriously. Nor were Russian operatives Maria Butina and Alexander Torshin able to use ties to the National Rifle Association as a conduit to advance Russian interests inside the Trump campaign on a “consistent” basis.
Nevertheless, “The Committee found that highly evolved tools used to shape popular sentiment were utilized in support of the Trump Campaign during the 2016 election season, and Russia has made use of such tools in its influence operations,” although the Committee still refused to see “a link between Russian efforts and the Campaign's use of these tools.” The Committee, or at least the Republican majority, repeatedly treated the Trump campaign as being led by buffoons who were more bluster than having a clue about what they were doing or how to use what was handed them by the Russians on a silver platter. The Russians, apparently, just went about their business with the Trump campaign basically telling them to do as they pleased as long it helped them.
The Committee admitted that Russian intelligence used “commercially available services” normally used for targeted sales promotions, but instead for political messaging at targeted audiences. “Russia applied these technologies and methodologies to its influence· campaign during the 2016 election and, in doing so, conducted foreign influence operations against the United States with a speed, precision, and scale not previously seen. The commoditization of these influence capabilities by for-profit firms working in the political and particularly electoral space, coupled with deeply concerning foreign government and intelligence service ties to some organizations, were troubling enough to warrant additional Committee scrutiny.”
Regarding the infamous Christopher Steele Dossier, the Committee found that the “FBI gave Steele's allegations unjustified credence, based on an incomplete understanding of Steele's past reporting record. FBI used the Dossier in a FISA application and renewals and advocated for it to be included in the ICA before taking the necessary steps to validate assumptions about Steele's credibility. Further, FBI did not effectively adjust its approach to Steele's reporting once one of Steele's subsources provided information that raised serious concerns about the source descriptions in the Steele Dossier. The Committee further found that Steele's reporting lacked rigor and transparency about the quality of the sourcing.”
Yet many in the FBI and overseas intelligence regarded Steele as a credible source, and “therefore did not want to discount the reporting, despite its sensational nature.” GPS Fusion’s Glenn Simpson, who hired Steele first on behalf of Republicans hoping to stop Trump’s momentum during the primaries, stated to the Committee that “I never had an occasion where his work proved to not be reliable. When we got these memos, we would do all kinds of public record work and things in my office to figure out whether what people were telling Chris was plausible and credible. Does this person really exist? Was he in this place at the time that he said that they were? That research produced nothing conclusively contradictory. Nothing that I have seen disproves anything in the dossier. Which isn't to say I think it’s all true. I don't think Chris thinks it's all true, either. But there's a difference between things being fake or a hoax or a fraud or a lie and things being incorrect. "
The most “salacious” claim in the Steele Dossier—that the Russians have tapes of Trump cavorting with prostitutes in a Moscow Ritz Carlton hotel room in 2013 that could be used for blackmail purposes, cannot be completely discounted. The potential that they did exist was concerning enough for Trump that Cohen was tasked to discover if they actually existed, and acquire them if they did. Cohen claimed that six different people contacted him about such tapes, one of them even threatening blackmail, but the alleged tapes never surfaced.
However, “According to two former employees of the Ritz Carlton in Moscow, in 2013 there was at least one officer permanently stationed at the hotel. This non-uniformed- officer was believed to be a Russian intelligence officer and had access to the hotel's property management system, guest portfolios and notations, as well as the network of ‘hundreds’ of security cameras at the hotel. The officer was believed to be able to monitor the camera feeds from his office. The former employees did not know whether there were cameras permanently in certain rooms, but both believed it was possible, and there was awareness of recording devices being prearranged in rooms in anticipation of the arrival of particular guests...Both former employees also recalled a significant presence of paid sex workers at the hotel. One reported that a third-party security firm that was employed by the hotel was responsible for managing the women, in addition to its other duties.” Knowing Trump’s “affection” for young, attractive women—and those of a certain “type,” such as porn star Stormy Daniels and former Playboy Playmate Karen McDougal—one’s “imagination” doesn’t have to stray too far from the possibilities of truth.
The Committee also reported that it was stymied in its investigation by Trump officials like K.T. McFarland, Sarah Flaherty, Stephen Miller, Avi Berkowitz, and Steve Bannon, all claiming “executive privilege,” and that “The Trustees of the Transition provided their documents to the WHCO for review, in order to assess whether any documents could be candidates for an executive privilege assertion,” and that “Ultimately, 65 documents from the Transition, 32 documents from McFarland, and one document from Flaherty were withheld from production.”
National news media outlets assert that the Senate Intelligence Committee makes charges on Russian election interference on behalf of the Trump campaign that goes beyond what is revealed by the Mueller report. However, like the Mueller investigation, it could not ascertain the whole truth because of there was no “whistleblower” in Trump’s inner circle who was willing to divulge truthfully the skeletons in the closet that need to remain hidden to protect Trump. We must believe that, because the alternative could be said to be much worse—that Trump is a brainless puppet, and Putin is his puppetmaster.
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