Lessons to be learned from the Russian experience with terrorism?

Recently I was standing outside the Kent Public Library waiting for it to open, when I happened to overhear a conversation between a young man and a much older one. The younger man was saying that he preferred to speak to older folks because they had more “sense” than other people. By this he meant that he couldn’t carry on a “conversation” with someone his own age because they were “ignorant”—and by this he meant that “they” didn’t know how to speak “respectfully” to him. He was always just on the edge of meting out “respect” from the point of a fist or worse. And you wonder why so many people get themselves killed, he said. 

I found this a plainly disturbing and sad commentary on how certain elements in our society have decided to conduct “conflict resolution.” It is also seems to suggest that violence in this country often has no obvious rational explanation, that it is often highly “personal” in nature. Instead of discussing differences and trying to find mutually agreeable solutions, some people simply wish to send a “message” that seldom has the “educational” aspect intended either heeded or understood as anything save mindless barbarism. In the Boston Marathon bombing, the perpetrators were two immigrant brothers—the older of the two who was apparently unable to integrate into American society and chose to explore radical Islam and its “message” of revenge and hatred, and the other, someone whose mind seemed a sponging vessel which his older brother could shape at will. 

The president of  the Russian Republic of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, has said in a statement that despite the fact that the perpetrators—Tamerlan Tsarnaev and his brother Dzhokhar—are of Chechen extraction, the “evil” in their actions must be found in the United States. This is a disingenuous statement to say the least. No one was “persecuting” the Tsarnaevs in this country, and they had greater opportunity to advance themselves than some of the “natives” in this country do. 

So who better to “explain” the meaning of all of this but that source of anti-American propaganda, RT News—formerly “Russia Today”?  The price of being “sanctimonious” towards the Kremlin in its approach toward terrorism within its own borders, it declares, and “sympathy” towards the aspirations of Chechens only closed this country’s mind to the reality of “acts of calculated violence”—until it actually happened right here.  RT can be accused, of course, of being sanctimonious themselves in its deliberate “forgetfulness” of the U.S.’ own experiences with terrorism, which includes what is likely the single bloodiest act of terrorism in history on 9-11.  RT was also quick to point out that Russian authorities apparently contacted American intelligence in regard to Chechens who immigrated to the U.S. and who they regarded as potential Islamic extremists. However, this was not out of altruistic motivation; the Russians were afraid that potential terrorists would receive “training” in the U.S. far from the reach of Russian security, and would eventually return to conduct terrorist acts. One of these identified “threats” was Tamerlan Tsarnaev, but FBI interrogators determined that he was not  “dangerous”—at least not for Russia, as it turned out. 

There was more finger-pointing, of course. The bombers’ dear mother claims that they were “set-up” by the FBI, and a relative claims that he kicked Tamerlan Tsarnaev out of his house during his recent six month visit, allegedly for expressing uncomfortable Islamic radicalism.  The relative insists that this stay in a relative hotbed of poverty and Islamic-inspired violence like Dagestan was not what “radicalized” him. 

Left unanswered is why Chechen “revolutionaries” would conduct their “business” in the U.S. when it was with Russia they had their “issues” with. Since the breakup of the old Soviet Union, Russia has “allowed” some ethnic populations in the Caucasus to form their own independent states (Georgia, Armenia—both with large Christian majorities), but has chosen to hold on to some troublesome regions for reasons not exactly clear, since they no longer have  economic or strategic value.  There is of course some speculation that Russia doesn’t want hotbeds of Islamic radicalism on its borders that it can’t control, and allowing them to gain independence would inspire other Islamic regions that are technically part of “old Russia.” But Russia might have made things worse for itself when its tough action in two conflicts turned a minority of Chechen nationalists into Islamic extremists. 

After two bloody wars between Russian forces and guerilla forces, Chechnya is in fact more “stable” than its two Islamic neighbors, Dagestan and Ingushetia—which are now experiencing much worse violence.  While most Chechens remain supportive of eventual independence, few care for the brand of Islamic government proposed by the extremists still hiding in the mountains and occasionally emerging to cause Russians to remember that they still exist. The two brothers, although ethnic Chechen, were born far from their “home” land, in Central Asia; this is explained by the fact that there was a mass deportation of Chechens during World War II, when Stalin saw them as potential allies of the Germans who would undermine Soviet forces defending the Caucasus during the Germans’ 1942 summer offensive (which ended with the surrender of the German Sixth Army in Stalingrad).  This explains why census data shows that ethnic Russians were in the majority in Chechnya at least until 1960, before native Chechens were allowed to return if they wished; nearly all ethnic Russians have since left Chechnya.  

Russian has indeed paid a price in its not always successful effort to keep its Islamic “republics” under strict control; also in evidence is Russia’s relative inexperience in handling terrorism.  In 1995, a hospital in the town of Budyonnovsk was the scene of a hostage crisis, in which 120 captives were killed after three attempts by Russian security forces to seize the building. The failure of these attacks led to a ceasefire agreement; many of the former hostages criticized the Yeltsin government for ordering the assaults in the first place.

In 1996, 200 Chechens guerillas attacked an airbase near the town of Kizlyar in Dagestan. After destroying several helicopters, the Chechens were chased into town, where they took up to 3,000 hostages and held them in another hospital.  Most were soon released on the promise of free passage for the rebels back to Chechnya, but negotiators were not informed that a force of Russian paratroopers were ready to intercept the  convoy before it reentered Chechen territory.  After this attack, the Chechens holed-up in another village; but following several failed assaults by Russian forces, the government claimed that the Chechens had killed their remaining hostages, using this as an excuse to fire indiscriminately into the village. Some of the Russian forces were killed by “friendly fire,” and in any event the Chechens held on long enough for most of them to escape into the Chechen mountain country, ending  in another embarrassment for the Russians.  Not surprisingly, one of the reasons why Vladimir Putin was elected president was his tough talk on Chechnya and end this “shame.”

In September 1999, the cities of Buynaksk, Moscow, and Volgodonsk were rocked by explosions in apartment complexes, killing nearly 300 people and injuring over 600. However, there was at least some suspicion that all was not as it seemed. A few days later it was reported that a resident of an apartment building in the city of Ryazan had seen two men carrying suspicious sacks into the basement of the building. Police were notified, and they found sacks of white powder, with a timing device and detonator armed and ready. After the device was disarmed, it was discovered that bomb-making material was Russian military in origin. It was also revealed that a telephone operator had overheard two men telling each other they had to “get out of town” fast; the incoming call was traced to an office of the FSB—the successor to the KGB. Thus rumor had it that Russian intelligence was at work to concoct an “event” which would garner public support for another war in Chechnya. The anger from these suspicions was so strong that FSB director Nikolai Patrushev was forced to issue a statement, admitting that indeed the bombs in Ryazan were planted by FSB agents—but only to “test” the responses of security forces.

In 2002 a Moscow theater was engaged in a performance when armed Chechens took the audience hostage. In the course of this infamous event, 130 hostages were killed when Russian security forces fired canisters of an "unknown" gas into the building. Both the terrorists and hostages succumbed to its effects.  Several of the female guerillas were seen running for the balcony to escape the gas, but lost consciousness at the foot of the stairs; left unexplained was why they were found with extensive bullet wounds.  Many of the security personnel also succumbed to the gas, but more telling was the fact that in the aftermath of the attack, it was revealed that even the Chechens who passed out from the gas attack were shot where they lay. 

In 2004 almost 400 people were killed in the Beslan school hostage taking, including children. Again this was an example of either incompetence or overzealousness on the part of Russian security. It was charged that 80 percent or more of the hostages were killed by random fire by security forces.  One observer noted that this "presents a chilling portrait of the Russian leadership and its total disregard for human life." 

More recently was the 2010 Moscow Metro attack perpetrated by two female suicide bombers, killing nearly 40 people, and the 2011 attack on Moscow’s Domodedovo International Airport, which killed 36 people.

It is to be expected that many American commentators—including those who have found Russia to be more foe than friend—are suddenly sympathizing with Russia. However, it should be noted, contrary to current reporting in the U.S., that terrorist acts in Chechnya has decreased dramatically while its Islamic neighbors have seen vastly increased levels of violence, and some of these attackers were militants from Dagestan, where Tamerlan Tsarnaev spent many months in—and there is little doubt that he prepared for “war” while there.  Last year, a suicide bomber—an ethnic Russian woman who converted to Islam—assassinated Sheikh Said Afandi, who publicly denounced the Islamic insurgency and fundamentalism. Afandi’s killing was only one of a string of sectarian murders in Dagestan against Sufi Muslims regarded as not sufficiently fundamentalist in their beliefs.  

Nevertheless, we can learn something from the Russian experience.  Dmitry Babich, political analyst for the “Voice of Russia,” told RT that in regard to Chechen and other Islamic “refugees” from Russia immigrating to the West, “A lot of them didn’t change their convictions. A lot of them are die-hard Islamists. They didn’t change after leaving Russia and I can easily imagine that a lot of them consider both Russia and the US parts of the same western decadent civilization. In this situation they can wage their jihad not necessarily in a place like Syria or Iraq, but also in the US… If you expect any kind of gratitude and thankful thinking from these people you’re dead wrong. Most of the jihadists are egotists in their convictions. They think that they have the right to ascertain their convictions, they have the right to commit violence acts if they feed their cause. And their cause is the creation of this Islamic State. Maybe it could be an Islamic State in the North Caucasus. It could be a universal Islamic Caliphate. But that’s their thinking and I’m afraid in Boston they are dealing with exactly that kind of thinking.”