Hugo Chavez was the kind of president this country could have used

The recent passing of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has been greeted with extremes in opinion. For example, from Iran, Cuba and Russia there was praise for Chavez as a pain in the fundament to the U.S., and accusations that he was a victim of poisoning by the CIA. In the U.S., he was seen a rogue with “communist” inclinations and seemed “unstable”—even Newsweek once pondered if he was “insane.” Now, Americans don’t mind discussions of inequality; they just don’t like anyone who does something about it. 

We should not be blind to the fact that in the past the U.S. respect democratic processes in Latin America and the wishes of the “masses” was a sometime thing. For example, despite the fact that Salvatore Allende was elected to office in a free and fair election in Chile that the U.S. attempted to derail, Nixon and Kissinger set about his ouster; Kissinger was even quoted as saying that “I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people.” Nixon and Kissinger, like many on the right, frequently confused political and economic reform with “communism” in Latin America. The fact is that save for the isolated instance of Cuba, true “communism” is unlikely to occur because there is simply no grass roots support for it; when the Sandinistas took power in Nicaragua, the Reagan administration—in the belief that the country was ready to go “communist”—embarked on what would become the Iran-Contra scandal. Yet despite the fact that the Sandinista’s injected socialist policies in Nicaragua, the country itself never became “communist,” but continued to operate on democratic principles. 

Most people in this country seem to believe that Chavez was just some ill-mannered boor, a third-rate character who got into power with propaganda messages that the poor ignorantly consumed, and had no coherent political philosophy save the “petty” grievances that those on the outside have against those on the inside, or the “have-nots” against the “haves.” Of course, we know all about that kind of thing in this country; the difference is that the majority demographic in this country (and I’m talking about both the male and female versions of the branch) still have a de facto stranglehold on the political, economic and social institutions. Things are different in Venezuela, where not everyone buys into the theory that the white “elites” who dominate the institutions of the country have their interests in mind. 

And a majority of Venezuelans (and I ignore the few expatriates in this country who are only speaking for their Euro-elite relatives) believed Chavez had their interests in mind, and there is no doubt that he was not only sincere in his own conviction, but had every intention of his reform program carried out—by whatever means necessary. The U.S.-backed oil strike and coup attempt in 2002 against Chavez—during which the country’s national media discredited itself by proving that it was nothing more than a mouthpiece for the country’s elite class—merely hardened Chavez’s resolve in this regard.

Before Chavez took power, this was a country with a long history of military dictatorships, some of whom attempted reforms, but were usually thwarted in the end by the conservative elite class. Most Americans hardly know anything about their own history, so it shouldn’t come as a surprise that people know even less of countries even in its own hemisphere. Since its independence from Spain, this was a country with a long history of military dictatorships. There were attempts by a few of these rulers to implement social and economic reforms that addressed the needs of the impoverished majority, but these efforts were largely ineffective because of opposition from the conservative Euro-elites. Land redistribution to small farmers proved to be ineffective, since most of these farmers were not given title to the land and thus were not able to obtain credit. The discovery of oil in the early 20th century improved the economic picture in Venezuela dramatically, but not surprisingly the wealth was unevenly distributed, not just to the “elite” class, but to foreign countries. 

When Chavez became president, this was a country whose national income was still heavily dependent on oil income. Income distribution was heavily unbalanced, with 80 percent of the population living in poverty. The failure to diversify the economy in the past accounts for the fact that half the labor force is employed in the “informal” economy—street vending, farmers’ markets, “home” businesses, panhandling, moonshining, prostitution, drug-dealing, black marketing or any other money-making enterprise that operates beyond government regulation.

To change this, Chavez economic plans included “cooperatives” in which workers cooperate to manage a business. Tens of thousands of such worker-run businesses have been developed since Chavez became president, up from a few hundred before he took office. These operations are provided credits for start-up, and while corruption isn’t absent, in general the program has been successful at least as a start in diversifying an economy too dependent on oil revenue. Chavez’ economic policies also incorporate “endogenous” development, which rather than imposing a strict set of rules, attempted to adapt policy to the particular set of variables found among differing groups and availability of resources.

Chavez’ adherence to “Bolivarian” principles—personalized as “Chavismo”—which as enunciated by the 19^th liberator Simon Bolivar include nationalism (i.e. free from control of the U.S.), equitable distribution of resources, and local participation in governance—was seen by some fair-minded people as Chavez’ identification with, and genuine effort to help, the impoverished majority. In 2007, The Nation decided that Chavez’s policies were more “democratic” than most people in this country gave them credit for: 

Chavismo is not an adequate description of the social movement that makes up Chávez's political base, since many organizations predate his rise to political power, and their leaders and cadre have a sophisticated understanding of their relationship with Chávez. Over the last couple of years, a number of social scientists have done field work in urban barrios, and their findings confirm that this synergy between the central government and participatory local organizations has expanded, not restricted, debate and that democracy is thriving in Venezuela. Chavismo has ripped open the straitjacket of post-cold war Latin American discourse, particularly the taboo against government regulation of the economy and economic redistribution. Public policy, including economic policy, is now open to discussion and, importantly, popular influence. This is in sharp contrast to Costa Rica, where a few months ago its Supreme Court, with the support of its executive branch, prohibited public universities from not just opposing but even debating the Central American Free Trade Agreement, which soon won a national referendum by a razor-thin margin.

The “harsh” reality for Americans is that they knew very little about Chavez, and what they knew was typically ignorant of the reality on the ground. The worst thing that could happen to Venezuela now is if conservative governance by the national elitists should return and dissolve all the progress that has been made in that country.